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1 The Importance of Investing in Fundamental Research
In uncertain economic times and a volatile political landscape, the question of our
panel discussion might strike as otiose. Faced with major and pressing challenges—
from climate change to biomedical research, from cybersecurity to agrotechnology,
just to mention some examples—our society seems already to be struggling in
meeting research targets that affect millions of people around the globe. Why should
we care about fundamental research? Tight national budgets often force hard choices
about which kind of investments should be prioritised. And if cuts have to be made,
investments in fundamental research tend to be the !rst ones in the line.
In what follows, I make some brief remarks about the importance of fundamental
research for society—be it fundamental research in particle physics, cosmology, or
other areas. I will make some speci!c comments about how I see fundamental
research contributing to human cultural "ourishing and conclude with some re"ec-
tions about scienti!c progress in pursuing fundamental research.
A ground-clearing remark is !rst in order, though. Fundamental research is a
misnomer, and on occasions, an unfortunate one too. For it suggests that research
comes in two varieties: the fundamental and the non-fundamental. Or, the abstract
and the applied, to use another dichotomy. Thus, posing the question about the value
of fundamental research inevitably invites a wave of scepticism if the underlying
assumption is that a choice is forced upon us between the abstract and the applied.
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But reality is a lot more nuanced that this dichotomy might suggest. For the
boundaries between research into the foundations of a particular !eld feeds seamlessly
into technological innovation. And technological innovation in turn informs directions
of research in fundamental areas. High energy physics is a case in point. It is for
example well-known that innovations such as the World Wide Web were developed
by scientists working at CERN. Technology such as the PET scan were spearheaded at
CERN while developing new technology for particle physics. And more recently
research on proton therapy has been carried out at CERN in the !ght against cancer.
But leaving here aside these general considerations, there are other reasons as to
why investing in fundamental research is important. These general considerations
have got to do with what philosophers often describe as a duty of care that we have
towards our ‘later’ selves, or the next unborn generations.
Imagine someone’s life as a slow motion cartoon where if the speed is suf!ciently
slow, you can almost see the individual snapshots the carton consists in. Each of these
snapshots is indexed at a particular time t1, t2, t3,. . . tn. The question arises as to
whether choices made at a particular time, say t3 should be done with an eye to
bene!tting the subject at the time, or with an eye also to bene!tting the later self at time
tn. For example, one might enjoy smoking a cigarette at time t3 and be careless about
the long-term consequences of her/his choices at t3. Or one might become mindful of
the long-term health risks that such action might engender at tn and decide at t3 to cut
on smoking if at t3 one cares enough about one’s later self and wellbeing at tn.
Philosophical theories of personal identity and intergenerational justice depend
on how we might be inclined to answer temporally-indexed questions of this nature.
If we see ourselves as part of a continuum spectrum, where actions and decisions
taken at any particular time are bound to affect the well-being and "ourishing of our
later selves at later times, then I think an easy answer is available to our overarching
question, i.e. “Investing in fundamental research—for whom?”. The simple and
straightforward answer is: “For our later selves”.
Investing in fundamental research is indeed for our later selves, and for the next
generations. More broadly, it is for humankind. We do not invest in fundamental
research for the sake of some immediate economic return that someone somewhere
is directly going to bene!t from. But for advancing scienti!c knowledge, for
exploring uncharted territories, and for making progress in our collective under-
standing of the natural world we live in.
Thus, in a way, this is a very long-term and open-ended kind of investment. And
in assessing the value of this kind of investment, in the light of the aforementioned
duty of care towards our later selves, my inclination is to warn against a principle that
economists tend to use all the time: the principle of discounting the future. The
economic principle that a dollar today is more valuable than a dollar tomorrow is a
bad principle for assessing the intrinsic value (as opposed to the cost-effects
economic value) of scienti!c research in general, I think. This is the case no matter
whether the research in question is about climate science, cancer research, or
fundamental physics. We have a duty towards future unborn generations to study
and understand the effects of anthropogenic climate change, to study and monitor the
long-term risks of smoking cigarettes, as much as we owe to them a better under-
standing of the natural world we live in.
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One reasonable concern one might have (and some people do indeed have) about
investing in fundamental research is not however (or is not only) about the economic
costs attached to it, or the long-term risky returns of the investments. In a way,
investments of this nature invite us to pause and think about the progress made in the
speci!c area, and to ask ourselves the extent to which further funding is warranted.
We live in a society that is obsessed with metrics and ways of measuring progress
towards targets. And when it comes to fundamental research in pretty much open-
ended areas—be they particle physics or cosmology for example—even setting
targets to achieve might prove very dif!cult.
Because of its very nature, fundamental research tends to be exploratory and
open-ended, with targets that ought to be realistic but at the same time are as
revisable and as open-ended as the !eld of inquiry itself. For it would be naïve at
best to expect fundamental research to be railroaded in some prede!ned way towards
pre-given !xed targets. Some of the most important breakthroughs might happen in
unexpected ways, while some pre-given targets might prove unachievable, after all.
Here I think we need to be careful and not fall prey to a very common but in my
view short-sighted view of how to assess scienti!c success and progress when it
comes to fundamental research. There is a deeply instilled tendency to measure
scienti!c progress and success in any given area in terms of numbers of scienti!c
discoveries and the potential for discovery; by setting milestones and monitoring
how well we have marched to achieve those. Think of it. It is a pervasive view that
science progresses by discovering new things, or by inventing new tools or enabling
new technological innovation. We discover a new particle; patent a new vaccine;
unveil a new phenomenon.
Unsurprisingly, a sense of frustration tends to accompany areas of science where
the notion of progress does not necessarily conform to this received and somewhat
intuitively satisfying notion. High energy physics is one of those areas where
frustration might occasionally become tangible among practitioners and the general
public too. Will we !nd new physics beyond the Standard Model? Will the new
generation of colliders deliver on the promise of !nding new phenomena and shed
light on various unsolved puzzles? Given the open-ended nature of fundamental
research how to precisely answer these questions is far from trivial and obvious.
But here is my positive take-home message. Even in the worst-case scenario,
even if we were not able to discover new particles, new phenomena, new physics
beyond the Standard Model as particle physicists hope for (and have reasons for
hoping for), we would still have made progress. Because scienti!c progress is not
necessarily (or exclusively) discovery-driven. Progress in fundamental research is
not just about !nding out what is actual, but also (and equally importantly) is about
delimiting the space of what is possible. Progress in HEP often means being able to
rule out live options, carve out the space of what is reasonable to expect, or of what
we believe to be possible to the best of our knowledge. That is what physicists at the
LHC, CERN, have been doing over decades. They have !xed more rigorous
constraints to rule out possible candidates for Beyond Standard Model physics.
They have run high-precision measurements to re!ne our understanding of the
Standard Model. They have clari!ed where the boundaries of the current space of
possibilities lie. This is progress in physics and in science, more in general.
Investing in Fundamental Research: For Whom? A Philosopher’s Perspective 115
Consider an analogy with cancer research. Yes, we have not yet found as of today
(July 2020) a !nal and de!nitive cure for cancer. But should we then conclude that
there has not been progress made in !ghting cancer? Of course, there has been huge
progress made in better understanding the mechanisms of carcinogenesis and the
speci!c details of particular kinds of cancers. Such understanding has advanced our
ability to have targeted treatments and to improve the overall prognosis for millions
of people worldwide.
Along similar lines, we might not have found as I write this piece (in July 2020)
the key to various outstanding mysteries about the low mass of the Higgs boson and
the nature of dark matter, among many others. But we do have made huge progress
in better understanding the gaps in the existing Standard Model, in conceiving
possible theoretical solutions for them, ruling them out too, and in setting more
rigorous constraints on what might be possible on the basis of the available evidence.
This is progress. Indeed this is the type of progress that warrants further funding
investment even if the !eld is exploratory and open-ended.
The real question then becomes the following. How can we make sure that such
investments are responsible and engage with local communities? How can we design
relevant infrastructures that can be used and reused? And can we supervise and
monitor the training and education of the next generations of scientists and make
sure they gain a set of skills that are transferable and with some clear pathways for a
wide range of applications? These are pressing and open questions to which I hope
philosophers of science will contribute more and more in this ongoing dialogue and
engagement with physicists.
Acknowledgments This article feeds into a larger project that has received funding from the
European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme (grant agreement European Consolidator Grant H2020-ERC-2014-CoG
647272 Perspectival Realism. Science, Knowledge, and Truth from a Human Vantage Point).
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
116 M. Massimi
